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Abstract Legitimacy is widely regarded as a founding prin-
ciple of ‘good’ and effective governance, yet despite intense
academic debate and policy discourse, the concept remains
conceptually confusing and poorly articulated in practice. To
bridge this gap, this research performed an interpretive the-
matic analysis of academic scholarship across public admin-
istration, public policy, law, political science, and geography.
Four core themes were identified in relation to representative
deliberation, procedural and distributive equity and justice,
and socio-political acceptability, with numerous sub-themes
therein. In an attempt to clarify conceptual confusion, this
paper grounds these theoretical debates in the context of flood
risk governance where numerous legitimacy dilemmas exist.
A number of questions are presented as conceptual ‘signposts’
to encourage reflexive governance in the future. Thus, more
broadly, we assert the importance of bringing legitimacy to the
forefront of contemporary flood risk governance discourse
and practice, moving beyond the realm of academic reflection.
Keywords Flood risk governance . Legitimacy . Justice .
Equity . Participation . Representative deliberation
Introduction
Legitimacy has been the subject of growing attention in
contemporary debates of climate change adaptation
(Paavola and Adger 2006; Cashmore and Wejs 2014), earth
system governance (Biermann and Gupta 2011), and, to a
lesser extent, flood risk governance (Alexander et al.
2016a; Mees et al. 2017). In the context of future uncer-
tainty and projected escalations of flood risk (Hirabayashi
et al. 2013), legitimate governance is seen as a cornerstone
for effective risk management and adaptation, as well as
steering action at the local scale (Termeer et al. 2011;
Cosens 2013). In order to address inherently uncertain
and complex problems such as flooding, the diversification
of risk management strategies is seen as an essential for
societal resilience (Driessen et al. 2016), yet this also
brings to the fore new challenges for legitimate gover-
nance. The shift towards risk management away from tra-
ditional paradigms of defence raises questions about the
distribution of responsibilities across a more diversified
spectrum of public-private actors, how to decide where
and how risk management strategies will be applied, and
share the distribution of costs and benefits (e.g. Mees et al.
2014; van Buuren et al. 2014).
Although legitimacy is commonly regarded as a
founding principle of ‘good governance’ (e.g. European
Commission, 2001; OECD, 2015), governance is con-
ceived as a threat to traditional notions of democratic le-
gitimacy (e.g. Sørensen and Torfing 2005). Governance
signifies the transition from centralised, state-led deci-
sion-making towards multi-layered forms of interaction,
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either across nested jurisdictional levels or through poly-
centric non-hierarchical formations (Marks and Hooghe
2004). Governance also signifies the inclusion of a broader
range of actors (e.g. public, private, and civil society) and
potential for various modes of governance in the realisa-
tion of collective goals (Driessen et al. 2012). With the
State no longer necessarily playing a pivotal role in deci-
sion-making, it is becoming increasingly accepted that tra-
ditional constructs of legitimacy rooted in democratic the-
ory must evolve (Papadopoulos 2000; Sørensen 2010;
Dellas 2011).
This has spawned considerable academic debate
concerning the hallmarks of legitimate governance. In the
field of flood risk governance—defined by Alexander et al.
(2016a: 39) as the actor networks, rules, resources, dis-
courses, and multi-level coordination mechanisms through
which flood risk management (FRM) is pursued—recent
efforts have been made to transform conceptual discus-
sions of legitimacy into frameworks for empirical assess-
ment (Mees et al. 2014; Alexander et al. 2016a; Mees et al.
2017). Whilst these frameworks provide valuable academ-
ic tools for evaluating the legitimacy of governance ar-
rangements, these remain situated amongst contested
knowledge about what constitutes legitimacy. This is fur-
ther complicated by the tendency for authors to employ the
term without explicit definition and assume mutual under-
standing; however, as this review will highlight, this is not
the case. Broadly speaking, democratic and political legit-
imacy typically occupy debates in political science
(Scharpf 2000; Klijn and Skelcher 2007), alongside moral
reasoning (Risse 2006; Jagers and Duus-Otterström 2008;
Adger et al. 2017). Legal scholars have examined the im-
plications of governance and legitimacy in the context of
(shifting) legal principles, alongside matters of responsibil-
ity, accountability, procedural and substantive fairness, and
the rule of law (e.g. Weber 1976; Ebbesson 2010; Termeer
et al. 2011; Spagnuolo 2011; Driessen and van Rijswick
2011; Buijze 2013). Building upon these issues, public
policy and administration scholarship seems to extend the
view on legitimacy towards wider matters of public partic-
ipation, social equity, and distributive justice (Few et al.
2007; Birnbaum 2016).
These concerns reflect the different emphases placed on
the input, process (or ‘throughput’), and output legitimacy
(Scharpf 1999; van Kersbergen and van Waarden 2004;
Schmidt 2013). However, this arguably presents an overly
simplified representation and portrays a linear progression
towards a final product or end goal (i.e. output legitimacy),
despite research emphasising the ongoing construction of
legitimacy and possibility for input legitimacy without out-
put legitimacy, or vice versa (Lindgren and Persson 2010;
Mees et al. 2014). Furthermore, perceptions of legitimacy
are neither static nor universal, but rather constructed
through normative, socio-cultural frames, agendas, and in-
terests, and thus variable from place to place and across
various groups in society (Scharpf 2000; Johansson 2012;
Bernstein 2011). As raised by Biermann and Gupta (2011:
1858), ‘a critical question becomes legitimacy in the eyes
of whom?’
Whilst a ‘one size fits all’ conceptualization is clearly in-
appropriate, if legitimacy is to truly become embedded in the
delivery, assessment, and monitoring of governance, there is a
need to clarify and identify ‘signposts’ to assist those negoti-
ating such endeavours.We hereby echo recent calls requesting
that theoretical debates be translated into governance arrange-
ments (e.g. Termeer et al. 2011). Drawing from a thematic
analysis of academic literature, this research discerns several
prominent themes, which are reviewed in turn. A range of
illustrative examples are employed to demonstrate the com-
plex space through which legitimacy discourses manifest in
flood risk governance and are constructed through socio-
cultural settings. In an effort to bridge the ‘legitimacy gap’
between academia and practice, a number of critical questions
are put forward to guide policy-makers and practitioners in
this field (although we also expect a degree of transferability
to other aspects of environmental governance). Given the
highly contextualised nature of legitimacy, rather than propos-
ing indicators and benchmarks for success (e.g. Mees et al.
2014), these ‘signposts’ adopt an alternative stance that em-
phasises the importance of openly reflexive flood risk
governance.
Methodology: analysing academic constructions
of legitimacy
In order to examine and synthesise academic constructions of
legitimacy, this research performed an interpretive analysis of
peer-reviewed articles. As the most comprehensive of the
Abstract and Index databases, Scopus was used as a starting
point for sampling. This was approached inductively through
a Boolean and truncation search (legitimacy* AND gover-
nance), searching the title, abstract, and key words. Further
limitations were then applied to the search, focusing on arti-
cles published or in press in peer-reviewed journals (as the
source type) and published in English. Exclusions were made
for non-relevant subject areas (e.g. medicine, engineering,
computer science, biochemistry, mathematics), then limited
to social and environmental sciences, producing 1565 articles.
Preliminary analysis of these results revealed the domi-
nance of publications in the UK and USA, and an increasing
trend in publications from the mid-1990s to today, with a
significant rise in publications from 2005 onwards. Citation
information and author-listed key words were exported as a
csv file (referred to as the ‘mother sample’). Results were then
filtered according to articles where ‘legitimacy’ formed an
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author-listed key word, amounting to 302 articles,1 originating
across multiple fields of scholarship, including public admin-
istration, public policy, political science, law, and geography.
Whilst these inclusion/exclusion criteria provided a necessary
starting point for sampling the literature in a pragmatic way,
we also employed a snowballing technique to identify addi-
tional literature cited within the sample. In particular, we fo-
cused on articles relevant for elaborating on key themes and
purposively added these to the analysis. An additional ca. 50
articles were captured within the mother sample and via
snowballing techniques.
Each article was downloaded into the qualitative analysis
software package, NVivo, and subject to thematic analysis to
unpick how legitimacy is theoretically framed within certain
contexts and related to debates in governance. Themes were
identified through an iterative and comparative process, cod-
ing for nuances and relationships between themes (Charmaz
2006). Central themes and sub-themes are outlined in Table 1
and illustrated in the thematic map presented in Fig. 1. As it
would be confusing to draw all points of connectivity, we have
intentionally organised the core themes in cyclic form to illus-
trate their interaction, whilst simultaneously portraying the
ongoing process through which legitimacy is constructed or
potentially deconstructed.
In the forthcoming sections, we critically reflect on each
theme in turn and elaborate on how these manifest in the
context of flood risk governance, drawing from real-world
examples to provide tangible reference points to ground the
theoretical discussion. Legitimacy debates pivot around mul-
tiple types of actors, such as the state (government, elected
officials, and public authorities), private citizens (individuals
and householders, referred to as ‘the public’), voluntary orga-
nisations, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and con-
servation groups, as well as market-based actors (e.g. insurers,
small businesses). Moreover, ‘the public’ are not a homoge-
nous group, but include those at risk of flooding, tax payers,
and riparian land and property owners. The different values,
interests, and agendas propagated by these groups invariably
influence perspectives on legitimacy; therefore, this article
employs a range of examples to demonstrate this. We do not
presume that one perspective is more valuable over another, or
impose norms for universally assessing legitimacy, as these
may also vary across socio-cultural-normative settings. Our
primary goal is to promote stronger engagement with the prin-
ciples of legitimacy in flood risk governance and propose
pragmatic signposts for translating the current academic de-
bate into practice. Therefore, each section concludes with a
series of critical questions to act as conceptual ‘signposts’ in
guiding future reflexivity on legitimate flood risk governance.
Although it is not possible to reference all articles reviewed,
the following selections draw from those that best capture the
range in the academic discourse on legitimacy.
Representative deliberation
Legitimacy is widely framed in the context of democratic
legitimacy (van Kersbergen and van Waarden 2004; Pierre
and Peters 2005; Sørensen 2010) and multi-stakeholder par-
ticipation (Few et al. 2007; Häikiö 2012; Mees et al. 2017).
Observations have been made about the shifting relationship
between the state and non-state actors (such as private citizens,
businesses, NGOs), from once unidirectional, top-down dif-
fusion of knowledge towards more multidirectional forms of
knowledge exchange and participatory governance (e.g.
Birnbaum 2016). This transition presents both a threat and
opportunity for addressing legitimacy deficits.
Equality and deliberation are central to the normative foun-
dations of democracy (Sørensen & Torfing 2005; Bernstein
2011). Whilst democratic equality asserts that those affected
by a decision ‘have an equal access to influencing that deci-
sion’ (Sørensen 2010: 4), determining the boundaries of
inclusion/exclusion are much debated. Traditional inclusion
criteria based on national citizenship and territory have been
called into question, with levels of affectedness now also
deemed relevant. This allows for ‘tailor-made patterns of dem-
ocratic inclusion’ (Sørensen 2010: 5). With this, observations
have been made about the growing trend towards public and
multi-stakeholder participation across a range of decision-
making contexts (e.g. Berghofer et al. 2008; Dombrowski
2010; Häikiö 2012; Cheyne 2015; Johansson 2012, 2016).
However, it should be borne in mind that participation is
motivated by different underlying rationales, which may not
directly relate to the legitimation of governance. For instance,
Mees et al. (2016a) show how efforts to ‘coproduce’ flood risk
governance between public authorities and private citizens in
selected European countries, may be driven by efforts to fa-
cilitate the transfer of risk responsibilities onto at-risk
householders and propagate societal acceptance of
alternative measures to flood defence. Birnbaum (2016) ar-
gues that public participation in the context of sustainable
development planning primarily appears to have established
as a professionally mediated exercise, seeking consensus as
1 For transparency and replicability, the full search string in Scopus was as
follows: TITLE-ABS-KEY (legitimacy* AND governance) AND (LIMIT-TO
(DOCTYPE, Bar^) OR LIMIT-TO (DOCTYPE, Bip^)) AND (LIMIT-TO
(LANGUAGE, BEnglish^)) AND (LIMIT-TO (SRCTYPE, Bj^)) AND
(EXCLUDE (SUBJAREA, BMEDI^) OR EXCLUDE (SUBJAREA,
BCOMP^) OR EXCLUDE (SUBJAREA, BENGI^) OR EXCLUDE
(SUBJAREA, BPSYC^) OR EXCLUDE (SUBJAREA, BNURS^) OR
EXCLUDE (SUBJAREA, BBIOC^) OR EXCLUDE (SUBJAREA,
BCENG^) OR EXCLUDE (SUBJAREA, BHEAL^) OR EXCLUDE
(SUBJAREA, BMATH^) OR EXCLUDE (SUBJAREA, BMATE^) OR
EXCLUDE (SUBJAREA, BIMMU^) OR EXCLUDE (SUBJAREA,
BPHAR^) OR EXCLUDE (SUBJAREA, BPHYS^) OR EXCLUDE
(SUBJAREA, BUndefined^)) AND (LIMIT-TO (SUBJAREA, BSOCI^) OR
LIMIT-TO (SUBJAREA, BENVI^)) AND (LIMIT-TO (EXACTKEYWORD,
BLegitimacy^)).
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opposed to confrontation and serving conventional governing
practices. In agreement, Few et al. (2007) note how
participation is often used as a rhetoric for consultation, with-
out any real redistribution of power. Therefore, in order to
Fig. 1 Thematically mapping constructions of legitimacy
Table 1 Core themes in academic constructions of legitimacy
Theme Explanation Example articles
Representative
deliberation
We coin the expression ‘representative deliberation’, drawing
from contemporary debates in democratic theory and
governance (sometimes referred to as interactive or network
governance). This theme concerns the representation of
stakeholders in participatory processes and the nature of
deliberation. Sub-themes included the distribution of power and
valuations of knowledge.
Klijn and Skelcher 2007; Few et al. 2007; Sørensen 2010;
Dombrowski 2010; Dellas 2011; Häikiö 2012; Barnaud and
Van Paassen 2013; Cheyne 2015; Mees et al. 2016a, 2017
Equity and
justice
Theme relates to discussions of equity and justice in governance.
The distinction is made between procedural elements (strongly
linked to the theme on representative deliberation) and
distributive debates (e.g. burden sharing). These debates are
influenced by underlying justice principles and moral
reasoning. Moreover, accountability is identified as an essential
pre-requisite (with further requirements for transparency, access
to information, as well as legal and socio-political mechanisms).
Paavola and Adger 2006; Termeer et al. 2011; Biermann and
Gupta 2011; Gross-Camp et al. 2012; Penning-Rowsell and
Priest 2015; Kaufmann et al. 2016; Hartmann and Spit 2016
Thaler and Hartmann 2016; Adger et al. 2017
Socio-political
acceptability
This theme unpicks the various ways through which
socio-political acceptability of governance and resulting
outcomes/outputs are judged. This is sometimes referred to as
‘output legitimacy’ (e.g. Scharpf 1999).
Two core sub-themes are identified. Firstly, governability indicates
a measure of performance. Governance outcomes are accepted
and legitimised for multiple reasons, including problem-solving
capabilities, goal attainment, efficiency, and learning capacity,
as well as normative and cultural expectations. Secondly, legit-
imation occurs through the acceptance of authority and distri-
bution of responsibilities.
van Kersbergen and vanWaarden 2004; Esty 2006; Biermann and
Gupta 2011; Cashmore and Wejs 2014; Mees et al. 2014; van
Buuren et al. 2014; Eriksen et al. 2015; Birnbaum 2016
400 M. Alexander et al.
appropriately judge participatory quality, it is essential that
such underlying motives are explicated.
Multi-stakeholder participation is not in itself a guarantee
of legitimacy, but can both undermine as well as support pur-
suits of legitimate governance (Thaler and Hartmann 2016).
Moreover, Mees et al. (2014) show how traditional forms of
hierarchical governance (whereby interests are indirectly rep-
resented by elected officials acting for the common good) and
emerging governance networks (i.e. potentially serving mul-
tiple interests) can both be perceived as legitimate.
Nonetheless, as a means of improving ‘input legitimacy’,
there is a strong consensus that participation ensures that dif-
ferent perspectives, values, and agendas of different stake-
holders are represented and deliberated within decision-
making (e.g. Dombrowski 2010).
The nature of deliberation is also pertinent. This ne-
cessitates forums for facilitating dialogue and negotiat-
ing potentially conflicting interests in the pursuit of col-
lective action (Termeer et al. 2011). According to
Sørensen (2010), interactive governance is particularly
amenable to this democratic norm, providing that the
right to dissimilar opinions is upheld. In turn, it is ar-
gued that deliberation across multiple stakeholders pro-
vides a pathway for increasing the quality of the output
and, thus, outcome legitimacy (Scharpf 2000). However,
this is somewhat dependent on the extent to which var-
ious perspectives are deliberated and weighted within
the governance process. The latter requires a balancing
of power; however, numerous research have documented
how dominant voices and power elites may skew the
representation of interests and advantage certain groups
over others (Bernstein 2011; van Buuren et al. 2014).
On this front, Few et al. (2007) assert the importance of
avoiding the illusion of inclusion and honestly communicating
the instrumental goals of public participation. In the context of
the UK coastal management, the authors observe the ‘contain-
ment of participation’ particularly where radical interventions
are proposed (i.e. phased relocation). For anticipatory adapta-
tion and complex environmental problems, more limited
forms of engagement may be required; however, there needs
to be some form of expectation management and clear delin-
eation of participatory goals to avoid dissatisfaction and cul-
tivate trust between governing authorities and the public.
In order to manage deliberation processes, the role of the
‘designers’ (or facilitator) of participatory processes as a neu-
tral bystander or as a mediator for power asymmetries should
also be considered. Barnaud and Van Paassen (2013: 21) pro-
pose a ‘critical companion’ posture, ‘whereby designers make
explicit their assumptions and objectives regarding the social
context so that local stakeholders can choose to accept them as
legitimate or to reject them’. The ‘make-up’ of the participa-
tory group should also be transparent. Indeed, there may be
instances where public participation can be justifiably limited,
such as situations where certified expertise is best placed to
determine actions (Renn 2006; Hartmann and Spit 2016).
Despite the fact that participation is a specified objective in
environmental policy and law (e.g. Water Framework Directive
2000/60/EC), in practice, this is delivered to varying degrees.
Performing a cross-country comparison, Priest et al. (2016)
examine the implementation of the EU Floods Directive
(2007/60/EC) in England, France, Poland, Sweden, and the
Netherlands. The authors adopt the stance that effective public
participation and access to justice is necessary for legitimate
goal attainment and, in turn, flood resilience. Although the
Directive requests the involvement of interested parties in the
production, review, and updating of FRM plans, specific details
on the nature of participation are absent, thus leaving consider-
able scope for variation. In Poland, EU accession in 2004 is
seen as a pivotal factor for change in flood risk governance and
public participation (albeit consultative) has grown accordingly
(Matczak et al. 2017). In contrast, this has had very little impact
in England where more active (as opposed to passive) partici-
patory initiatives have long been established (Priest et al. 2016).
However, caution should be exercised in the interpretation of
such findings or assuming that flood risk governance in one
country is more or less legitimate than another. As this review
will continue to demonstrate, constructions of legitimacy are
indeed multi-faceted and contextually rooted.
Moving the debate forward, challenges remain about how
to normalise and institutionalise legitimacy in the context of
governance. To this, we were inspired by the seminal work of
Sørensen (2010). Drawing from different epistemological
standpoints within neo-institutional theory, whereby institu-
tions are conceived as both shaping and being shaped by gov-
ernance, Sørensen argues that informal institutional features
(e.g. logics of appropriateness, normative codes, incentive
structures) can support the establishment of interactive
democracy. For instance, normative codes of conduct could
encourage those participating in governance to legitimise their
position by stating their representativeness to those affected
and provide transparent accounts of their activities within this
process to support democratic accountability. This might be
further reinforced by incentive mechanisms which grant or
withhold rights to participation. Logics of appropriateness
(March and Olsen 2008) could also promote the importance
of ‘input legitimacy’ and establish the governance arena as a
place of deliberative democracy whereby all forms of knowl-
edge and reasoning are valid. These suggestions could also
hold merit for flood risk governance.
Combining these debates, we coin the expression ‘repre-
sentative deliberation’. In order to minimise deficits in legiti-
macy on this count, we contend that critical reflexivity can be
articulated through the following questions:
& What are the driving motivations and instrumental goals
of stakeholder participation? (e.g. pursuit of knowledge,
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co-production, societal acceptance of pre-determined
decisions?)
& What factors have determined access to participation in
flood risk governance (i.e. inclusion/exclusion criteria)?
How are these justified against instrumental goals?
& How are different perspectives represented and weighted
within deliberation processes? What is the underlying jus-
tification for this?
& To what extent can participants make claims of
representativeness?
& To what extent does the governance process foster demo-
cratic deliberation, where all views/knowledge types are
respected and negotiated in the pursuit of a common goal?
In what forum does this take place (e.g. talk-based inter-
action or some other form)?
& What is the role of the facilitator(s) in participatory pro-
cesses? For example, do they adopt a ‘neutral’ stance or
take deliberate intervention in group dynamics?
& Are participants of the governance process required to
provide narrative accounts and/or document internal dis-
cussions to make the deliberation process transparent and
accountable?
Equity and justice in the construction of legitimacy
A second core theme discernible from this analysis pertains to
equity and justice (Table 1). Social equity is concerned with
qualities of fairness and is conceptually distinct from discus-
sions of equality, despite often being discussed in tangent
(Rawls 2001; Doorn 2015). Judgements of fairness are there-
fore tied to different principles of justice, including utilitarian,
libertarian, egalitarian, pluralists, and Rawlsians (see Miller
1999). Several authors have demonstrated how these justice
principles can manifest in different FRM approaches (Johnson
et al. 2007; Thaler and Hartmann 2016); thus, what is deemed
to be equitable (and thus legitimate) will vary across different
socio-cultural, normative settings.
These debates are present in both procedural and distribu-
tive elements of governance, which are now reviewed in turn.
However, it is also noteworthy that a considerable number of
articles conduct these discussions without explicit reference to
legitimacy. For example, in the flood context, considerations
about the fair and just distribution of flood risk, and costs and
benefits associated with FRM, are widespread (Fielding 2012;
Walker and Burningham 2011; Chakraborty et al. 2014;
Doorn 2015; Keessen et al. 2016; Thaler and Hartmann
2016). Alternatively, equity is sometimes framed as a distinct
but allied concept to legitimacy (e.g. Adger et al. 2005). These
articles were drawn upon as part of purposive sampling to
further elaborate and illustrate equity and justice concerns.
Procedural debates
Legitimacy can be negotiated through procedural elements of
governance, sometimes referred to as ‘input’ and ‘throughput’
components (Scharpf 1999, 2000; Risse 2006; Mees et al.
2014; Schmidt 2013). This is conceptually tied to ‘represen-
tational deliberation’ (BRepresentative deliberation^ section)
and the inclusiveness and fair representation of different inter-
ests. Indeed, skewed representation may result in both proce-
dural and distributive inequities (e.g. Paavola 2008). Thus, the
effectiveness and equitability of the rules and procedures
shaping the decision-making process is highly relevant.
A requisite for procedural justice, and legitimacy more
broadly, is accountability (Lawrence et al. 1997; European
Commission 2001; Risse 2006; Birnbaum 2016). In the pur-
suit of procedural justice, it argued that stakeholders should be
equally able to challenge decisions that have been made, ex-
ercise their legal rights, and hold designated actors to account
(Spagnuolo 2011; Schmidt 2013; Goytia et al. 2016).
Procedural and substantive fairness are embedded principles
that denote equal opportunity amongst stakeholders to influ-
ence the decision-making process and due consideration of all
interests in the resulting outcome (Paavola and Adger 2006;
van Buuren et al. 2014). These principles are also enshrined in
legal documents (e.g. Aarhus Convention 1998). Nonetheless,
securing accountability may be particularly challenging in the
context of complex environmental problems characterised by
spatio-temporal interdependencies, cross-scale interactions,
and high uncertainty (Biermann and Gupta 2011; Spagnuolo
2011; Cosens 2013), as well as across private-public partner-
ships (Dellas 2011).
Beyond the judiciary process and traditional pathways for
seeking democratic accountability, socio-political mechanisms
provide alternative pathways for ensuring accountability and
appear to be coming more common place, such as independent
public inquiries, ‘media trials’, and citizen juries (van
Kersbergen and van Waarden 2004; Klijn and Skelcher 2007;
Baber and Bartlett 2009; Sørensen 2010; Hahn 2011). With
these blurring boundaries of accountability, Birnbaum (2016)
distinguish traditional hierarchical accountability (e.g. electoral
accountability) from emerging forms of participatory account-
ability grounded in citizen participation. However, accountabil-
ity must also be pursued within the context of procedural jus-
tice. Indeed, the potential drawback of a growing culture of
scrutiny is the risk of unfair attributions of blame (Butler and
Pidgeon 2011; Smith et al. 2017; Alexander et al. 2016b).
In order to determine attribution, transparency is an impor-
tant precondition (Mason 2008; Hahn 2011; Mees et al. 2017)
and fundamental to procedural-based legitimacy (Esty 2006).
However, certain authors have called for more nuanced atten-
tion to transparency (Gupta 2010; Mitchell 2011), arguing that
‘different governance ends require differently designed trans-
parency policies, with varying implications for whether and
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how accountability and legitimacy can be secured’ (Biermann
and Gupta, 2011: 1858). In an attempt to clarify the legal
obscurity around the principle of transparency, Buijze (2013)
discern three common themes related to the availability, ac-
cessibility, and comprehensibility of information. Therefore,
access to information can be thought of as an additional pre-
requisite (Fig. 1). Looking to flood risk governance, there are
examples where both transparency and access to information
are aligned to legitimacy concerns. For example, speaking
about the French CAT-NAT regime for insurance, Suykens
et al. (2016) comment that the lack of transparency in decla-
rations of natural disasters undermines the system’s legitima-
cy. Transparency is seen as an essential pathway for promot-
ing democracy (i.e. informed deliberation, accountability, and
protection of individual rights), increasing trust and legitima-
cy, as well as improving the quality of decisions and facilitat-
ing acceptance (discussed further in BLegitimacy as a measure
of socio-political acceptability^ section).
Distributive debates
Social equity is predominantly discussed in terms of ‘winners
and losers’ and related to the spatio-temporal distribution of
outcomes (e.g. Adger et al. 2005), as well as in the context of
burden sharing and distributive justice (Table 1). In terms of
FRM, this is associated with the distribution of (i) flood risk,
(ii) financing FRM, (iii) recovery mechanisms, and (iv) re-
sponsibilities (Penning-Rowsell and Priest 2015). How these
are addressed across different countries (e.g. with varying ex-
posures to risks, cultural attitudes, political ideologies, and
administrative structures) is notably varied and manifest in
different burden sharing arrangements and legal principles
(e.g. Termeer et al. 2011).
For instance, in the Netherlands, flood protection is a con-
stitutional right and enacted through legal safety standards
(e.g. 1 in 10,000 recurrence interval along the coast), with
variations depending on the type of risk and cost-benefit ap-
praisals (Van Rijswick and Havekes 2012). These somewhat
utili tarian concerns are firmly situated within an
institutionalised egalitarian stance on national safety and com-
pulsory national solidarity against flooding (Van Alphen
2015; Keessen et al. 2016). However, national solidarity does
not guarantee equal benefits to all. Drawing attention to the
undebated and silent discourse of social justice in the Dutch
context, Kaufmann et al. (2016) highlight disparities between
citizens residing inside and outside protected areas, property
and land owners, and nature conservation organisations.
Despite observing numerous principles of justice and varia-
tions between types of floods (e.g. fluvial, coastal, and surface
water), this is rarely made explicit in Dutch FRM. In light of
projected increases of flooding in response to climate change,
disparities are likely to increase; thus, there is a need to bring
discussions of justice and debates on burden sharing to the
fore (Kaufmann et al. 2016). Similarly, Keessen et al. (2016)
argue for transparent public debate concerning the normative
and moral foundations of solidarity in discussions of adapta-
tion measures and fair funding arrangements in the
Netherlands.
In contrast to the Dutch system, the absence of stat-
utory rights to flood protection and mandated safety
standards in England means decisions about the distri-
bution of resources for flood defences are primarily de-
rived from cost-benefit analysis. Whereas, historically,
this was guided by efforts to maximise economic effi-
ciency and utilitarianism (Johnson et al. 2007), with the
introduction of Partnership Funding in 2012, this has
now been complemented by egalitarian principles of jus-
tice and efforts to provide equal opportunity in the dis-
tribution of resources. In theory, this can be considered
to be a fairer approach from the perspective of those at-
risk; however, the extent to which communities truly
have equal opportunities to funding has been called into
question, particularly as the ability to mobilise social
capital and resources to secure funding at the local scale
may vary from place to place (Alexander et al. 2016b).
To help mitigate these effects, the funding calculator
incorporates a deprivation bias to support communities
‘least likely to be able to contribute towards the cost of
a flood defence scheme and less able to recover after a
flood without additional support from the state’ (pers
comms, with former national-level policymaker). This
reflects a more Rawlsian perspective on social justice,
whereby inequalities are justified for the benefit of
those least advantaged (Rawls 2001). Moving beyond
the perspective of at-risk citizens, the emphasis on con-
tributions from beneficiaries arguably also instils a fairer
approach from the perspective of the tax payer (Thaler
and Priest 2014). However, recent research conducted
by Adger et al. (2017) shows how perceptions of fair-
ness are contextually varied, particularly when
confronted with moral intuitions. Drawing from moral
foundations theory, these authors demonstrate the pres-
ence of vulnerability-based moral intuitions in England
following the winter 2013/2014 floods. In this instance,
solidarity was evident through widespread examples of
public involvement in recovery efforts and general sup-
port for the distribution of additional funding to protect
flood-vulnerable communities.
Debates on equity and justice are also relevant for the study
of recovery mechanisms from natural hazards, whether pro-
vided through private market-based insurance, stated-
implemented insurance, or compensation schemes, and can
manifest in many ways across countries (see Priest, 2014;
Penning-Rowsell and Priest, 2015). Adopting a legal perspec-
tive, van Doorn-Hoekveld et al. (2016) examine the influence
of ‘preflood’ compensation, i.e. measures used to prevent
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floods, as opposed to recovery mechanisms (e.g. flood storage
areas), upon distributive effects of floods in selected European
countries. For example, in the Netherlands and Belgium, ex-
propriation is obliged to compensation for the loss of property
value, yet elsewhere, such costs are transferred to the injured
party (e.g. England). In turn, it is argued that more equitable
management of such distributive costs increases the legitima-
cy of flood risk governance (vanDoorn-Hoekveld et al. 2016).
Critical questions have also been asked about the distributive
fairness connected to upstream and downstream mitigation or
rural-urban divides (Thaler and Hartmann 2016). According
to Cosens (2013), conscious recognition of these cross-scale
linkages is essential for securing legitimate governance.
As with procedural debates, transparency forms an impor-
tant precondition for securing distributive justice and enhanc-
ing the legitimacy of governance. Inevitably, certain justice
principles may be valued and prioritised over others depend-
ing on the context of decision-making; however, as stressed
by Termeer et al. (2011: 175) ‘to improve the legitimacy of
adaptation measures it is important that all stakeholders are
informed and can understand the more fundamental choices
that have been made before practical measures are
undertaken’.
Embedding equity, justice, and moral reasoning in flood
risk governance
Moving forward, we propose several signposts to promote
critical reflexivity and explicate equity, justice and moral rea-
soning underlying flood risk governance. Also highlighted is
the importance of understanding how these may shape public
perceptions of legitimacy and in turn inform strategies for
mitigating perceived legitimacy deficits.
& What is the nature of underlying principles of justice in
certain aspects of FRM?
& How are resources for FRM allocated and justified?
& How are responsibilities distributed in terms of risk man-
agement? Recovery from floods? Are the distribution of
responsibilities regarded to be fair across stakeholders?
& To what extent do different groups have equal access to
procedural justice?
& To what extent are inclusion/exclusion criteria for partici-
patory governance justified in relation to equity, justice,
and moral debates?
& How do perceptions of fairness, justice, and moral ‘right
and wrongs’ vary across groups? Are there procedures in
place to assess and monitor societal perceptions of these?
& How are perceptions of injustices and moral ‘wrongs’
managed?
& Are checks and balances in place to ensure the fair attri-
bution of accountability?
Legitimacy as a measure of socio-political
acceptability
Throughout this analysis, we observed the recurring framing
of legitimacy in terms of acceptance, or sometimes expressed
as output legitimacy (Scharpf 2000; Sørensen and Torfing
2005; Adger et al. 2005; Bernstein 2005; Lindgren and
Persson 2010; Biermann and Gupta 2011; Schmidt 2013).
When deconstructed, we revealed a number of different un-
derlying factors shaping the socio-political acceptability of
governance, broadly grouped as follows:
& Governability (a measure of capabilities)—related to goal
attainment, efficiency, problem-solving capacity, capaci-
ties for learning, as well as normative and cultural
expectations
& Authority and the distribution of responsibilities
Governability refers to the performance capacity of the
governance network, or more importantly, perceptions of per-
formance capacity, which in turn influence its legitimation. A
range of criteria may dictate how performance is judged,
whether in terms of problem-solving capabilities, goal attain-
ment, or efficiency (e.g. Risse 2006; Biermann and Gupta
2011; Mees et al. 2017), as well as perceptions of fairness
(BEquity and justice in the construction of legitimacy^ sec-
tion). More recently, these views have broadened to take into
account the ability to self-reflect, innovate, learn, and imple-
ment change, which are widely regarded as essential for cul-
tivating adaptive capacities (e.g. Voß and Bornemann 2011;
Fournier et al. 2016). According to van Kersbergen and van
Waarden (2004), whereas input legitimacy is dependent on
effective accountability, this must be balanced against
governability, i.e. the capacity to deliver socially valued out-
comes by addressing the problem at hand.
Stakeholder participation is widely credited with the latter
and seen as an essential pathway for increasing the quality of
governance decisions and resulting output by drawing from
multiple types of knowledge (Scharpf 2000). An example in
FRM is when public participation is used to inform specific
measures of defence or mitigation. In England, Alexander
et al. (2016b) document how public exhibitions have been
used to demonstrate flood modelling and facilitate a dialogue
between the public and risk management authorities in the
Hull and Haltemprice catchment, with some instances where
local knowledge has help validate flood models and inform
the location of defence works. In this sense, participation is
employed as strategy for legitimising pre-determined actions
(also see Few 2007; Birnbaum 2016). On the flip side to this
argument, participation may also pose a potential threat to
output legitimacy if it results in inefficiencies and the inability
to act (Höreth 2001; Risse 2006; Lindgren and Persson 2010;
Dellas 2011). A good example of this is the case of the
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IJsseldelta in the Netherlands and the formation of an adapta-
tion strategy, studied by van Buuren et al. (2014). Here, the
authors report how participatory interaction and principle of
social learning can cast doubt on the credibility of proposed
measures and undermine output legitimacy.
Legitimacy may also be judged on the basis of normative
and cultural expectations. Bernstein (2011: 19) draw attention
to the sociological construction of legitimacy from the lens of
political economy, emphasising that ‘what constitutes legiti-
macy results from an interaction of the community of actors
affected by the regulatory institution, i.e. the public who grant
legitimacy, with broader institutionalized norms – or social
structure – that prevail in the relevant issue area’. Cashmore
and Wejs (2014) introduce the notion of normative legitimacy
in the context of climate change planning and its moral con-
struction through the perceived social obligations of institu-
tions. Expectations are thus ‘founded upon a belief in the
appropriateness of certain social norms’ (e.g. protection of
vulnerable people) (Cashmore and Wejs 2014: 3). Flood risk
management is also attached to perceived social contracts be-
tween the State and its citizens, and most notably, the expec-
tation that the state should protect the population. A ‘breach’
in this contract, bought about by the occurrence of flooding,
can often spark discourses on what is deemed to be socially
(un)acceptable. Smith et al. (2017) demonstrate this in the
context of the winter floods on the Somerset Levels in the
UK, which prompted major discord between the local com-
munity and governing authorities, and led to calls for policy
reversals with regard to dredging. This example highlights an
additional challenge when social expectations are at odds with
legal obligations and policy trajectories. In this context, miti-
gating the ‘legitimacy gap’ arguably needs to become a pro-
cess of negotiation and expectation management.
Cashmore and Wejs (2014) also define an additional type
of legitimacy from the field of psychology, referred to as
cultural-cognitive legitimacy, which can also be interpreted
within the umbrella of acceptance. Here, legitimacy is not
challenged unless there is a change in the routine and cultur-
ally accepted and expected way of doing things. When ap-
plied to the study of climate change planning in Aarhus,
Denmark, normative legitimacy appeared to be less salient
than cultural-cognitive legitimacy, with evidence suggesting
that climate change planning is legitimised (amongst the busi-
ness community and political elite) through alignment to
existing structures and discourses of economic and ‘green’
growth. However, as demonstrated by van Buuren et al.
(2014), aligning FRM with other agendas can also ignite con-
troversies and resistance to adaptation schemes amongst other
types of stakeholders (in this case rural communities).
Our analysis also revealed how acceptance can be formu-
lated in terms of authority and acceptance of the governance
arrangement as an authoritative voice and also influenced by
the governability factors aforementioned (Bernstein 2005;
Adger et al. 2005; Lockwood et al. 2010; Lindgren and
Persson 2010; Biermann and Gupta 2011; Eriksen et al.
2015). For example, Mees et al. (2014) define legitimacy ‘as
the acceptance of authority and justification of political pow-
er’ (p. 672). The legitimation of governance is partially influ-
enced by its representativeness. As asserted by Klijn and
Skelcher (2007), the representativeness of participants is inte-
gral if they (and the governance arena more broadly) are to
gain legitimacy and acceptance as ‘legitimate players’, both
amongst the constituency affected and within the political sys-
tem. Authority is also steered through interactions and ‘legit-
imized, reinforced and challenged through the use of knowl-
edge’ (Eriksen et al. 2015: 529). Therefore, stakeholder par-
ticipation can play an important role (Paavola 2008).
In addition, acceptance of authority may also be steered
through assessments of output. On these matters, considerable
attention has been given the issue of European democracy and
democratic legitimacy of the European Union (EU), with dis-
cussions centred on its political or democratic legitimacy (in
terms of authority), as well as output legitimacy in terms of the
capacity to deliver effective solutions to salient issues affect-
ingMember States (Höreth 2001; Lindgren and Persson 2010;
Schmidt 2013). According to Scharpf (2000), dissatisfaction
with the latter may have in turn undermined the former and
account for the perceived loss of democratic legitimacy.
Alongside the acceptance of authority, we also included
acceptance of responsibilities (and power) through which au-
thority is gained. Here, we observed evidence to suggest that
participatory processes are being employed to facilitate the
transfer and acceptance of new responsibilities in environmen-
tal management (e.g. Birnbaum 2016). In flood risk gover-
nance in particular, local flood risk action is increasingly seen
as more important in holistic and sustainable risk-based ap-
proaches. Looking across several EU countries, Mees et al.
(2016a) document how public participation is employed as
part of these efforts to coproduce flood risk governance and
disperse responsibilities, particularly amongst direct benefi-
ciaries of FRM.
Societal acceptance of responsibilities and outputs of
governance may be influenced by multiple factors. For
instance, Mees et al. (2014) show how the output legitimacy
of flood adaptation strategies was facilitated by transparent
risk and responsibility communication in Hamburg, whereas
in Helsinki and Rotterdam, acceptance was attributed to low
awareness and underestimations of flood risk. Similarly, Mees
et al. (2016b) demonstrate high output legitimacy in Flemish
FRM and limited concern with ‘throughput’ participation
amongst citizens themselves, largely owing to a prevailing
view that FRM is a governmental responsibility. This framing
of legitimacy is likely to come into conflict if trends towards
public-private risk sharing continue.
Transforming these debates into ‘signposts’ to guide efforts
to bridge ‘the legitimacy gap’, this analysis draws attention to
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the multiple ways in which societal acceptance is influenced.
Thus, speaking of legitimacy in terms of acceptability is argu-
ably unhelpful. If challenges are bought against arrangements
of governance then a fundamental staring point is to determine
the underlying factor(s) shaping this. Dissatisfaction might be
attributed to views on participatory quality, perceptions of
fairness, moral expectations, or whether the action challenges
the politically, socially, culturally accepted ways of doing
things. Understanding this is essential for designing strategies
to address legitimacy gaps in flood risk governance. Beyond
ex post measures, socio-political acceptability could also be
proactively encouraged through participatory processes and
open dialogue to derive objectives and expectations against
which flood risk governance can be reasonably judged.
Bridging the legitimacy gap
This paper contributes to a growing repository of multi-
disciplinary research into the legitimacy of governance, as well
asmore recent concerns with legitimate flood risk governance in
particular (Alexander et al. 2016a; Mees et al. 2017).
Recognising the somewhat ambiguous nature of legitimacy
and multitude of meaning, we performed a comprehensive and
interpretive analysis of the literature from which four core inter-
locking themes were discerned in relation to representative
deliberation, procedural and distributive debates of social eq-
uity and justice, and socio-political acceptability. Furthermore,
this paper has shown how these themes may emerge through
different aspects of flood risk governance and perspectives.
In an effort to bridge the gap between academia and policy
and practitioner communities, a number of critical questions
(or ‘signposts’) are presented to support the translation of
these theoretical discussions into practical governance.
Ultimately, what is called for is the practice of reflexive gov-
ernance, whereby actors are encouraged to scrutinise and
make transparent ‘their underlying assumptions, institutional
arrangements and practices’ (Hendriks and Grin, 2007: 333).
This is particularly warranted in the context of flood risk gov-
ernance where a broad range of legitimacy dilemmas exist and
appear to be in a state of flux, with projected increases in
flooding igniting re-evaluations of burden-sharing arrange-
ments across public-private parties (Driessen et al. 2016).
Transparent and open reflexivity can assist in the identifica-
tion, deliberation, and negotiation of such legitimacy di-
lemmas across involved stakeholders, but may also in turn
minimise the potential detriment of legitimacy deficits
(particularly where these may undermine resilience goals;
e.g. van Buuren et al. 2014).
Although legitimacy can be conceptualised as a multi-
faceted problem, we acknowledge that the salience of these
may vary depending on the aspect of decision-making, the
actors involved, depending on spatio-temporal scales and
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across different socio-cultural normative settings through
which legitimacy is (de)constructed. Further empirical studies
are required to elaborate on these further and sustain momen-
tum for legitimacy-based research. Moreover, we wish to en-
courage more action-based research to assist in the uptake and
practice of reflexive flood risk governance, whereby legitima-
cy is brought to the fore.
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